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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) is designed to
create a fair and effective means to bring to justice the worst offenders against international
criminal law: persons who commit genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and,
when and if a definition is agreed upon, aggression.' The model of criminal procedure in
the ICC Statute is a hybrid, including elements of both civil and common-law procedures.
Procedure is also strongly influenced by rights-based thinking (concerning individual pro-
tections) that comes from modern national constitutionalism and international human
rights standards.'
The model of defense services in the ICC Statute is based upon an enforceable right to
counsel. A second key element is a set of provisions by which the judiciary supervises in-
vestigations by the prosecutor in order to assure fairness to the defense. The availability of
defense counsel is an important part of these provisions.
Yet, questions remain about the role and functioning of defense counsel in this system.
The ICC Statute omits provisions guaranteeing sufficient funding for fair defense investi-
gation of the facts of a case. Additionally, the ICC Statute omits a clear determination of
privileges and immunities of defense counsel and staff to investigate the facts of cases in
the states in which evidence is or may be located or in which the alleged crimes occurred.
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Elise Groulx, on its proposal for an Office of the Defense for presentation to delegations participating in
meetings of the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court. The views expressed in this
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1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at arts. 5-9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, (adopted
by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. The current text has been subject to technical revision through a
"no objection" procedure, and may be subject to another round of technical revisions.
2. See Kenneth S. Gallant, Individual Human Rights in a New International Organization: The Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M.C. Bassiouni et al. ed., 1999).
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These are to be established in an agreement on the privileges and immunities of the court.
This agreement is scheduled to be drafted by the Preparatory Commission for the Inter-
national Criminal Court for submission to the Assembly of States Parties for adoption by
the Assembly, and eventual adoption by the states that are parties to the ICC Statute.'
Additionally, many of the functions of defense counsel will depend on the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence, also scheduled to be drafted by the Preparatory Commission for
submission to the Assembly of States Parties for its eventual adoption.
4
I. Scope and Attachment of Rights to Counsel
The right to counsel is a cornerstone of fair criminal justice. It is recognized interna-
tionally as vital to protecting the human rights of the accused.' It is prominent in the scheme
of protections in the ICC Statute, both in the investigatory stage and after an accusation
has been made.
A. COUNSEL DURING THE INVESTIGATORY STAGE
Counsel, including appointed counsel for those who cannot afford a lawyer, is available
to certain persons for certain events during an ICC investigation. The ICC Statute thus
provides for protection of defense rights early in an investigation, when it is not usually
available in common-law jurisdictions. There is, however, no general right to counsel dur-
ing the investigative stage, as there is after a specific person has been accused.
During an investigation, whenever "there are grounds to believe that a person has com-
mitted a crime within the jurisdiction of the court, and that person is about to be questioned
either by the Prosecutor, or by national authorities pursuant to a request made under Part
9 of this Statute [concerning international cooperation and judicial assistance]," that person
has a right to "have legal assistance of that person's choosing, or, if the person does not
have legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the
interests of justice so require, and without payment by the person in any such case if the
person does not have sufficient means to pay for it."6 Questioning is to occur in the presence
of counsel "unless the person has voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel.", This
3. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Annex I, Resolution F, sees. 5(0, 9 (Resolutions adopted by the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court)
[hereinafter Final Act]. The naming of this document as an "Agreement" indicates that this will be an agreement
among the Court and the States Parties to the ICC Statute, rather than an act of the Assembly of States Parties
(to which it is presented after drafting by the Preparatory Commission). See, e.g., Agreement on the Privileges
and Immunities of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/25 (June 5, 1997), arts.
27-29 [hereinafter ITLOS Agreement] (providing for signature, ratification, and accession procedures). This
may well create complexities for implementing the ICC Statute, if one or more States Parties refuse to ratify
the Agreement as finally adopted in the Assembly.
4. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 51; Final Act, supra note 3, secs. 54(h), 9. The Rules of Procedure
and Evidence will not be submitted to States Parties for ratification, but will be created by the ICC as an
international organization.
5. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; see also Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1990) available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/h-comp44.htm>.
6. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 55(2)(c).
7. Id. art. 55(2)(d).
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effectively means that the person must be informed of his or her right to counsel before it
is determined that the person waived this right. The essential right that is protected is the
right "[t]o remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination
of guilt or innocence."' There is also the right to be informed, prior to being questioned,
that there are grounds to believe that one has committed a crime.9 This procedure looks
similar to the British common-law system of allowing counsel for a suspect during inter-
rogation. 10
Another issue that may arise here is whether there are sufficient grounds to believe a
person has committed a crime in order to trigger this right during an interrogation. No
formulation is given in the ICC Statute. It may be that the drafters believed that persons
being questioned would be informed of the right to counsel whenever the prosecutor be-
lieved that the person would be charged or whenever there was any evidence indicating
that the person may have committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the court. It is hoped
that the Rules of Evidence and Procedure will address this issue and will provide counsel
liberally. Additionally, practice in states with similar systems may inform the determination
of when the right to counsel will be afforded."
Additionally, judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber are allowed or required to appoint counsel
to represent the interests of the defense in certain cases, even if no person has yet been
accused of a crime and even if the suspect is not being interrogated. The Pre-Trial Chamber
may authorize "counsel for a person who has been arrested or has appeared before the court
in response to a summons" to participate with the prosecutor in "a unique opportunity to
take testimony or a statement from a witness or to examine, collect or test evidence, which
may not be available subsequently for purposes of a trial." 2 The language provides for
appointment of defense counsel to participate in the proceeding "where there has not been
such an arrest or counsel has not been designated." 3 This is not stated in the statute as an
absolute right of the person, but is within the control of the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the
prosecutor has a duty to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of such an opportunity. 4
Where counsel is appointed in the absence of an arrest or choice of counsel by a possible
suspect, "defense" counsel may have no actual client. That is, under the ICC Statute it
appears that counsel may be appointed in a situation where the prospective accused may be
unavailable for interview and counseling or to give instructions to counsel. The matter may
be complicated further by the fact that several persons, some with conflicting defenses, may
have evidence given against them during a single "unique investigative opportunity." Where
8. Id. art. 55(2)(b).
9. See id. art. 55(2)(a).
10. The protection in the ICC Statute is broader than the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
protections in the common-law system of the United States, because Miranda only applies when a person is in
custody. The British system may allow for silence during police questioning to be considered in some circum-
stances if a criminal defendant later testifies at trial.
11. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(c). In the absence of definitive rules in the ICC Statute,
documents adopted pursuant to the statute, and international law, the court may look to general principles of
law derived from national laws of legal systems of the world.
12. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 56(1), (2).
13. Id. art. 56(2)(d).
14. See id. art. 56(l), (3). No specific standard for defense counsel participation or other measures con-
cerning unique investigative opportunities is specified, other than necessity "to ensure the efficiency and in-
tegrity of the proceedings and, in particular, to protect the rights of the defense." Id. art. 56(1)(b).
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the targets of the investigation are clear, separate counsel may be appointed for each po-
tential accused. The court, however, may not know in advance the identity of those against
whom evidence will be given. For this reason, "defense" counsel may be placed in the
position of attempting to protect the interests of more than one potential accused, who at
later stages may try to blame each other for the alleged crimes. On the other hand, if the
accused has been arrested or the suspect is available for interview by counsel, the situation
resembles one familiar to defense counsel in many national systems.
The model here is heavily influenced by the civil law tradition of judicial supervision of
criminal investigations. The Pre-Trial Chamber supervises the prosecutor closely in deter-
minating when counsel should be appointed to protect the interests of the defense or other
measures should be taken." In most common-law visions of the role of counsel, the ap-
pointment of counsel without a client with whom counsel could consult would be seen as
highly anomalous. Nonetheless, even to this author, who practices and teaches in the
common-law tradition, this procedure holds out great promise for improving the fairness
of criminal proceedings by providing a device for discovery and preservation of testimony
or evidence by the defense early in the criminal process.
The appointment of counsel where, as here, it is possible that the interest of more than
one person may require representation would be seen as a conflict of interest requiring
appointment of more than one counsel. By hypothesis, however, cases where the conflict
is known in advance can be dealt with by appointing separate counsel. In general then, the
possible conflict will not be known until the time of the actual search or interview consti-
tuting the unique investigative opportunity. As an initial suggestion, the appropriate course
of action for "defense" counsel that are not appointed to represent the interests of a specific
potential accused would be to attempt to preserve evidence that could be useful to any
potential accused.
In both of these devices, the ICC Statute recognizes the need for defense counsel to
operate under the court's authority to participate in proceedings involving national au-
thorities. The right to have defense counsel present at questioning requested by the court
includes situations when the interrogation is done by national authorities. As will be seen
below, the statute presents issues of the duty of states to allow defense counsel to operate
in their territory."a
B. COUNSEL FOR "THE AccUSED"
The right to counsel after accusation is set forth in more comprehensive terms. The
following language specifies the right:
In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to... the following minimum
guarantees, in full equality;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense and to communicate
freely with counsel of the accused's choosing in confidence; ...
(d)... [T]o conduct the defense in person or through legal assistance of the accused's choosing,
to be informed, if the accused does not have legal assistance, of this right and to have legal
15. See id. art. 56(2), (3). Judicial supervision during the investigative phase of investigations and its relation
to the role of defense counsel is discussed further in Part III infra.
16. See Part II(A), infra.
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assistance assigned by the court in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it;
17
The right to appointment of counsel if the accused does not have sufficient funds is not
stated as an absolute, but is only required by the text "where the interests of justice so
require." In the context of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, it is difficult
to imagine a situation in which an accused was unable to pay the costs of defense counsel
but the interests of justice did not require appointment of counsel. This language is taken
from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).8 This ICCPR
provision defines internationally recognized protections in all criminal cases, even those
that are relatively minor, where the interests of justice may not be seen to require the
appointment of counsel in all cases. Though awkwardly phrased for its context, this pro-
vision of the ICC Statute should be read to make the indigent accused's right to counsel
absolute, as is the right to counsel of interrogees who are suspected of crime.' 9 On the other
hand, it is possible to imagine a few situations in which the interests of justice require
appointment of counsel even when unrequested by the accused. This would especially be
the case when the court questions the accused's competency to conduct his or her own
defense, or if an unrepresented accused became so disruptive as to require removal from
the courtroom. 0
The time when this right to counsel attaches is not specifically set forth in the ICC
Statute. The right operates "in the determination of any charge" and in favor of "the ac-
cused." The term "accused" is generally used in the statute to refer to a person against
whom a charge has been made and not to a person who is merely being investigated.2'
There is, however, no specific definition of when a person becomes an "accused."
At the very least, a person is an accused at or after the confirmation hearing on the charges
that is to be held promptly after a person against whom an arrest warrant or a summons is
served appears in court.22 The word "accused" denotes the person charged throughout the
part of the ICC Statute concerning trial.23 The term "accused" does not appear in article
61, describing the confirmation hearing, but the hearing "shall be held in the presence of
the Prosecutor and the person being charged, as well as his or her counsel."24 The as-
sumption of the presence of counsel here suggests that the right to counsel set out in article
67, concerning rights of the "accused," has already attached at this stage, at least where the
accused has submitted to or has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court.25 While
17. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(1).
18. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 14(3)(d).
19. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 55(2).
20. See id. art. 63(2) (removal of disruptive accused from courtroom "only in exceptional circumstances
after other reasonable alternatives have proved inadequate, and only for such duration as is strictly required").
Id.
21. Compare ICC Statute, arts. 53, 55, 58 (discussing "persons" being investigated or against whom warrants
are being sought), with arts. 62, 65, 66, 67, 68(2) (discussing "the accused" who is being brought to trial).
22. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 61 (defining the confirmation hearing procedure, the stage at which
a three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber makes a judicial determination whether there is "substantial grounds to
believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged"). Id.
23. See id. at pt. 6.
24. Id. art. 61(1).
25. If the person has not been found, and "all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her
appearance before the Court, and to inform the person of the charges and that a hearing to confirm those
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counsel may have entered the case at an earlier stage, 6 this will not necessarily have hap-
pened, suggesting that the reference to counsel at the confirmation hearing is linked to the
right to counsel in article 67.
This view is supported by the language of article 67, where the right to counsel applies
to "the determination of any charge."27 This indicates that the right should apply to any
proceeding after accusation that has the potential to affect the determination of the charge,
that is, whether the accused will be punished and what that punishment will be. The con-
firmation hearing, at which the court may determine that there is or is not a basis for
bringing a charge, affects "the determination of [the] charge." It occurs only after the
issuance of a warrant or summons, which must contain the name and other relevant iden-
tifying information concerning the person sought, a reference to crimes within the juris-
diction of the court alleged against the person, and "[a] concise statement of the facts which
are alleged to constitute those crimes."28 The warrant or summons is thus in ordinary
English an "accusation" and a person named in such a document has been "accused."2 9
After a person surrenders to the court, or voluntarily appears pursuant to summons, "the
Pre-Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the person has been informed of the crimes which
he or she is alleged to have committed, and of his or her rights under the statute, including
the right to apply for interim release pending trial."30 Presumably, the rights to be com-
municated include the right to counsel. Further, the ordinary language argument concern-
ing the meaning of "accused" applies here. A summons or warrant has already been issued,
making an accusation based upon a finding by the Pre-Trial Chamber that there is reason-
able cause to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the
court.
The ICC Statute also recognizes that the person facing a confirmation hearing needs to
prepare for that hearing. The person has the right to know the charges that the prosecutor
charges will be held," the Court may, on its own motion or the Prosecutor's motion, hold a confirmation
hearing without the accused's presence. Id. art. 61 (2)(b). "In that case, the person shall be represented by counsel
where the Pre-Trial Chamber determines that it is in the interests of justice." Id. (There is a typographical
ambiguity in the document in English, French and Spanish as to whether this provision is part of subsection
(b).)
26. ICC Statute, spra note 1, arts. 55, 56(2), at 1030-33, discussed in section I(A) supra.
27. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(1), at 1040.
28. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 58(3) (warrant) and (7) (summons: but substitute "the crime" for "those
crimes") at 1033-34. Under this section, the warrant or summons itself contains more information than it does
in many jurisdictions, where the facts underlying the case are stated in an affidavit, complaint, indictment or
other document accompanying the warrant, and on which the warrant is based. In the Statutes of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTFY] and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ICTR], as well as earlier drafts of the ICC Statute, an indictment has been the usual document on
which an arrest warrant has been issued. ICTFY Statute, art. 19, Annex to Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 U.N. Doc. S/25704 & Add.1 (1993), approved
by S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); ICTR Statute, art. 18, Annex to S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Report of the International Law Commission,
G.A. Res. 10, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 94, U.N. Doc. A /49/10 (1994) (Draft statute for an
international criminal court, art. 27).
29. Cf Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31 (interpretation according to "ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty"), done May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT]. Note that this treaty will not apply of its own force to the ICC Statute if some states
that ratify the statute are not parties to VCLT. See VCLT, art. 4. Much of VCLT, however, including the
substance of article 31, is considered to be customary international law.
30. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 60(1), at 1035.
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seeks to confirm and the evidence on which the prosecutor intends to rely, object to the
charges, challenge the prosecutor's evidence, and present evidence." Additionally, as dis-
cussed below, the Pre-Trial Chamber has the authority, at the request of the person, to
issue orders or seek cooperation of states to produce defense evidence.2 The structure of
the statute suggests that it recognizes the need to collect evidence in preparation for the
confirmation hearing. All this indicates that the right to counsel established by article 67
begins early enough to allow for preparation for the confirmation hearing.
Whether the right to counsel set out in article 67 applies to proceedings before the Pre-
Trial Chamber prior to the confirmation hearing (and the time and proceedings needed to
prepare for it) is unclear from the ICC Statute's language. Weighing against such a right
is the fact that counsel is not mentioned as a matter of right in proceedings before the Pre-
Trial Chamber, except for the confirmation proceeding." Moreover, article 67 is in part 6
of the ICC Statute, entitled "The Trial." While activity after the confirmation hearing
generally occurs in the Trial Chamber,14 preliminary activity occurs in the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
'hether the right to counsel attaches as soon as a person is surrendered or voluntarily
appears before the court is an issue that can be made moot if the Assembly of States Parties
adopts a Rule of Procedure and Evidence" requiring that counsel be appointed for any
person who cannot afford counsel immediately upon surrender or voluntary appearance.
The hope is that the Assembly of States Parties will adopt such a rule.
The right to counsel should also include, either as a matter of interpretation of the ICC
Statute, or by rulemaking act of the Assembly of States Parties, matters that do not nec-
essarily go to the "determination of [a] charge," but affect the rights of a person while
charges are pending. Specifically, the right to apply for interim release pending trial can be
exercised most effectively by most persons through counsel rather than on their own behalf,
and it would be in the interests of justice to have this matter handled by counsel, as is
generally the case in national criminal courts.1
6
Even this analysis leaves open the question of whether the ICC Statute guarantees that
persons arrested by national authorities will have a right to counsel in national courts before
they surrender to the ICC. This is the most difficult question considered here. Speaking
in favor of such a right is the ordinary language argument above, which asserts that the
person has already been "accused" through the warrant that led to arrest. At least one issue
that is arguably relevant to the "determination of [the] charge" is to be addressed by the
31. See id. art. 61(3&6), 37 I.L.M. at 1036.
32. See id. art. 57(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1032.
33. See id. art. 60, 37 I.L.M. at 1035 (initial appearance before the court); if id., art. 59 (arrest proceedings
in the custodial state). Neither of these mention the right to counsel specifically. See also id. art. 55, 37 I.L.M.
at 1030-31 (separate right to counsel during questioning; no general requirement that this be in court); art.
56, 37 1. L. M. at 1031-32 (proceedings involving "unique investigative opportunity"; counsel may be appointed
but is not generally a matter of right).
34. See id. art. 61(11), 37 I.L.M. at 1037.
35. See id. art 51, 37 I.L.M. at 1028 (providing for authority to make rules).
36. Cf id. art. 21 (l)(c), 37 I.L.M. at 1015 (reference to national laws of legal systems of the world in deciding
cases). In many systems, conditions of pre-trial release are automatically set at the initial appearance in court
of the accused, whether or not the defendant has counsel. If the defendant does not meet these conditions,
counsel may generally request their modification upon appearance or appointment. Something resemblingthis
system might be appropriate for the Rules of Evidence and Procedure.
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competent national judicial authorities:"7 whether the person arrested is the person sought
by the warrant.38 To this extent, the national court proceeding may invoke the right of
criminal defendants to counsel under the parallel provision of the ICCPR, 9 either because
the state has ratified the ICCPR, because its provisions have passed into customary inter-
national law, or because the ICC is required to have states apply internationally recognized
human rights. 40 Additionally, under the ICC Statute, the national authority is required to
respect the rights of an arrested person, though without specifying those rights.41 Elsewhere
in the system established by the ICC Statute, States Parties are expected to comply with
the rights of persons under investigation, at least with regard to questioning.42
Speaking against the right to counsel is the fact that this right is not specified in the ICC
Statute. It can, therefore, be argued that the inclusion of other rights against states that are
parties to the statute is an exclusion of this right. Moreover, the argument that national
courts should apply parallel provisions of the ICCPR to require counsel in their transfer
proceedings is weak. State practice in extradition cases, analogous to transfer cases under
the ICC Statute, does not clearly recognize a right to counsel in those cases.43
Finally, states might be expected to resist extending the right to counsel here, as a matter
of law under the ICC Statute, as an infringement on sovereignty concerning internal pro-
ceedings.- Sovereignty concerns over creating a right to counsel in transfer proceedings
can be somewhat ameliorated, but not eliminated, by insisting that counsel in the courts or
administrative agencies of any state be qualified under the law of that state rather than (or
in addition to) the rules for admission to the bar of the ICC. This would at least allow the
state to retain control of the practice of law in its courts and agencies, though it would not
37. Id. art. 59(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1034. This excludes a pure administrative process for dealing with those
arrested.
38. Id. This does not include the question whether the person sought by the warrant in fact committed the
crime, but merely whether the person is the one wanted by the warrant. Nonetheless, this is part of the
"determination" of whether there is a valid charge against the person arrested. This provision probably grows
out of a case of mistaken identity in the ICTFY.
39. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 14(3), at 176, phrased in language followed closely by ICC Statute, art. 67(l).
40. This argument that the ICC is required to apply all internationally recognized human rights is based
on ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3), at 1015, and is set out in Gallant, supra note 2. But see note 41 infra.
41. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 59(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1034. The court is to determine if proper process
has been followed in making the arrest, though the consequences of an improper arrest are not specified.
42. Id. art. 55(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1031 (persons suspected of crimes within ICC's jurisdiction have the right
to remain silent and to counsel during questioning regardless of whether questioning is done by the prosecutor
or by national authorities pursuant to request).
43. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON EXTRADITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, SECOND RE-
PORT, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS: HELSINKI, at 214,228-
29 (1996); THIRD REPORT: TAIPEI CONFERENCE, at 14-16 (1998). The committee recommended that such a
right be recognized. See SECOND REPORT, at 236 (recommendation 3); THIRD REPORT, at 15-16. The author
was an alternate member of the committee.
44. In the law of interpretation of the constituent documents of international organizations, the rule of
effectiveness (that an international organization has the authority to achieve its purposes) often prevails over
the canon of construction that, in cases of doubt, infringements of sovereignty are not to be read into treaties.
See, e.g., INGRID DETTER, LAW MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 24-26 (1965) (citing cases of the
International Court ofJustice and the Permanent Court of International Justice). This principle is not, however,
a talismanic rejection of the principle of sovereignty, and therefore it cannot be used to reject out of hand a
claim that state sovereignty over procedure in its own courts and administrative agencies should prevail over a
claim that the International Criminal Court may dictate procedures in national courts that are ancillary to an
ICC proceeding.
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eliminate the problem of an international authority without a clear mandate in a treaty or
in customary international law imposing a right to counsel on a national system.
4
1
Here, the ability of the Assembly of States Parties to moot this question through a Rule
of Procedure and Evidence is not so clear. If the argument that the right to counsel in the
courts of States Parties does not exist because of sovereignty concerns is accepted, it is
difficult to see how a rule would make the intrusion more acceptable. It may be beyond the
authority of the Assembly of States Parties to expand the rights of persons described in the
ICC Statute, where the expansion would create new obligations for states that are parties
to the statute.
Finally, the statute does not make provision for a right to counsel for persons making
claims of unlawful arrest, detention or wrongful conviction. 46 Given that the person who
makes such a claim has been exonerated and is no longer "accused;" and the proceeding
occurs after the "determination of [a] charge," it is difficult to see how the right to counsel
of article 67 can be stretched to cover a claim proceeding.
I. Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Defense Counsel
and Funding of Defense Services
Under the ICC Statute, "[i]n the determination of any charge, the accused shall be en-
tided ... to conduct the defense in person or through legal assistance." 47 This is a slight
modification from the language of the ICCPR, which states that "[i]n the determination of
any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled ... to defend himself in person
or through legal assistance." 4
In the ICC Statute, defense counsel and investigators are directly given privileges and
immunities distinctly less than those of personnel of the Prosecutor's and Registrar's Offices
and given powers less than those of prosecutors. The protections that defense counsel will
have has been left for an Agreement on Privileges and Immunities that has yet to be ne-
gotiated. There is no funding guaranteed for defense investigation. These problems lead
to an "inequality of arms" that needs to be addressed by the Preparatory Commission of
the International Criminal court, by the Assembly of States Parties and possibly by sub-
sequent amendment of the ICC Statute.
A. POWERS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF DEFENSE COUNSEL: THE NEED FOR
DEFINITION AND PROTECTION IN THE AGREEMENT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
OF THE COURT
Defense counsel and investigators need freedom to operate in the states in which evidence
is located. In the ICC Statute as adopted, they are given far fewer powers, privileges and
immunities than their prosecutorial counterparts. There is, however, the agreement on the
privileges and immunities of the court, which remains to be written. If drafted with sensi-
tivity towards the defense function, the agreement may provide substantial protections
for it.
The structure of powers, privileges and immunities in the ICC Statute has four parts.
45. See also notes 58-59 infra and accompanying text.
46. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 85, at 1050; cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.
14(6), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976).
47. ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 67(1) & (1)(d), at 1040.
48. ICCPR, supra note 5, arts. 14(3) & (3)(d), at 177.
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There are different protections for "the court" and three different classes of persons that
are associated with the court and its functioning.
There is a general immunity for the court: it "shall enjoy in the territory of each State
Party such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. '49
This deals with the privileges and immunities of the court as an international organization.
The court is defined in the part of the ICC Statute concerning composition and adminis-
tration as including the Presidency; the Appeals, Trial, and Pretrial Divisions; the Office of
the Prosecutor; and the Registry.0 Defense counsel is not mentioned in this definition.
Additionally, the privileges and immunities of persons acting as officers or employees of the
court are dealt with in subsequent sections of the article specifying the court's immunity.5
Thus, this provision does not appear to grant personal privileges and immunities to defense
counsel.
Different officers and employees of the court are treated differently for purposes of privi-
leges and immunities. The highest level of protection is reserved for "[tihe judges, the
Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors and the Registrar." They "shall, when engaged on or
with respect to the business of the court, enjoy the same privileges and immunities as are
accorded to heads of diplomatic missions." 2 Defense counsel are not included in this group.
Even a minimal immunity for "counsel," which would have given them immunity from
liability for "words spoken or written and acts done by them in the discharge of their
functions," was dropped from the Draft ICC Statute."
The protection for the two other classes of persons is not fully defined in the ICC Statute.
Other operational employees of the court-the staff of the Office of the Prosecutor and
the Deputy Registrar and Registry staff-"shall enjoy the privileges and immunities and
facilities necessary for the performance of their functions, in accordance with the agreement
on the privileges and immunities of the court." 4 Privileges and immunities here are con-
ceived as personal immunities of these employees of the prosecution and registry, akin to
the privileges and immunities of the higher officials of the court.55 They are not, however,
defined in the statute, but left to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Court.
The protection for counsel, presumably including defense counsel, is also left for sub-
sequent definition. "Counsel, experts, witnesses or any other person required to be present
49. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1027. The entire effect of this provision is beyond
the scope of this article.
50. Id. art. 34, 37 I.L.M. at 1019-20. The term "Court" is used in other ways elsewhere in the statute. See
Gallant, supra note 2.
51. ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 48(2), (3), (4) & (5), 37 I.L.M. at 1027.
52. Id. art. 48(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1027.
53. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 49 (brack-
eted provision), U.N. Doc. A/CONE. 183/2/Add. 1 (1998), available at < http://www.un.org/law/icc/docs.htm >.
Similar language concerning all "[algents, counsel and advocates" has been included in the ITLOSAgreement,
supra note 3, art. 16(l)(c), available at <http://www.un.org.deptsA/los/splos25.htm>.
54. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1027. "[Tjhe agreement on privileges and immunities
of the Court" is not elsewhere defined in the main text of the ICC Statute, but is mentioned in Res. F, sec.
5(f) of Annex I, Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10, available at <http://www.un.org/law/
icc/docs.htm>. It is one of the documents that the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court will prepare.
55. The personal nature of the privileges and immunities can be deduced from the waiver provision. ICC
Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(5), 37 I.L.M. at 1027.
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at the seat of the court shall be accorded such treatment as is necessary for the proper
functioning of the court, in accordance with the agreement on the privileges and immunities
of the court." 6 As with the protection for lower employees of the court, the specifics of
protection for these persons are left to the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of
the Court. Unlike those employees, however, there is no presumption that the protections
for (defense) counsel, experts, witnesses, and others will have the character of personal
diplomatic-type privileges and immunities. These persons must simply be guaranteed "such
treatment as is necessary for the proper functioning of the court."
There are at least two reasonable readings of the territorial scope of defense counsel's
right to function under this provision. The first, broader reading of this section does not
place too much strain on normal linguistic usage.57 This reading applies the phrase "re-
quired to be present at the seat of the court" only as a modification of the phrase "any other
person," and not as influencing the meaning of the sentence with regard to "counsel, experts
[or] witnesses." Read in this way, counsel would be "accorded such treatment as is necessary
for the proper functioning of the court, in accordance with the agreement on the privileges
and immunities of the court," in all states that are parties to the ICC Statute. The proper
functioning of the court may require defense counsel's presence and operation in states that
are parties, and such operation would be protected "in accordance with the agreement on
the privileges and immunities of the court."
This reading is consistent with some other provisions of the ICC Statute. First, it is
consistent with the general authority of the court: "The court may exercise its functions
and powers, as provided in this statute, on the territory of any State Party and, by special
agreement, on the territory of any other State." 8 As pointed out above, the court as cur-
rently structured has no institutional place for defense counsel. The phrase "its [the court's]
functions and powers," however, should be read to include the defense function. The de-
fense function is a key element of any fair criminal justice system. Counsel for the defense
and their operations are clearly part of the court's function, as set out in several sections of
the ICC Statute, to cover both the investigation and trial. 9
Second, the two provisions previously mentioned assume the operation of defense counsel
in states that are parties, at least for specific purposes. These concern the right to counsel
during the investigative phase described above.6° Where the prosecutor or national au-
thorities acting at the request of the court interview a person against whom there are
grounds to believe the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the court,
that person has the right to counsel, including the right to free counsel if he or she cannot
afford counsel. Additionally, where the prosecutor has a unique investigative opportunity,
the Pre-Trial Chamber may appoint counsel or authorize previously appearing counsel to
participate in such an opportunity. The provision for appointment of counsel by the court
suggests that appointed counsel must be qualified to practice in the court. The fact that
they will be acting as lawyers in the national system of a state suggests that they must be
qualified to act within that system, especially in light of sovereignty concerns. Thus, the
56. Id. art. 48(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1027.
57. The reading given here to the English version applies as well to the ICC Statute, supra note 1, art.
48(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1027, in French and Spanish.
58. Id. art. 4(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1003.
59. Id. arts. 55, 56(2), 61(1), 65(1), 67, 37 I.L.M. at 1030-42; see arts. 57(2), 60(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1032-36.
60. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the
Court need to address cooperation with states that are parties to ensure that there will be
lawyers eligible to practice in all relevant systems. In addition, because the ICC Statute
contemplates cooperation during investigations with states not party to it,61 a mechanism,
in the rules or otherwise, to provide for ad hoc qualification of counsel (called "appearance
pro hac vice" in common-law systems) in such situations will be useful.
The alternate, narrower reading also fits standard English usage fairly naturally. This
second reading would give rights to defense counsel only in the host state, or in traveling
to reach the host state; that is, the seat of the court. The other named persons in this section
would also be given protection to travel to the seat of the court. While this protection is
certainly appropriate, it is insufficient to protect defense investigation elsewhere. This read-
ing excludes defense counsel from sharing the diplomatic privileges and immunities ac-
corded the prosecutor and deputy prosecutors or the "privileges and immunities and fa-
cilities necessary for the performance of their functions" of prosecutorial staff. These
prosecutorial protections do not appear to be limited to operations in (or travel to) the host
country, but to extend to all places within the territory of States Parties to the ICC Statute
in which prosecutorial staff perform their duties.
For these reasons, the broader reading, requiring that defense counsel be "accorded such
treatment as is necessary for the proper functioning of the court"62 in all states that are
parties, is more in accord with the structure of the statute and its object to provide a fair
criminal justice system to deal with those believed to have committed the worst international
crimes. 63
The question of which of these readings is correct will be liquidated in the process of
producing the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court. 64 Effectively, the
defense counsel's authority to investigate and otherwise operate in states other than the
host state, particularly states in which crimes are alleged to have been committed and evi-
dence may be found, will be controlled by this document.
Ideally, on an "equality of arms" theory, the rights of prosecution and defense to operate
in the territory of a State Party would be equal. This suggests that the Agreement on
Privileges and Immunities of the Court should be drafted to create powers, privileges, and
immunities for defense counsel and investigators that are equal to those of prosecutors and
prosecutorial staff.
It is unlikely, however, that this will be done in the strict sense. The ICC Statute grants
the prosecutor and deputy prosecutors "privileges and immunities as are accorded to heads
of diplomatic missions. 6 Staff of the prosecutor have "privileges and immunities and fa-
61. ICC Statute, spra note 1, art. 87(5), 37 I.L.M. at 1051.
62. Id. art. 48(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1027.
63. Cf VCLT, spra note 29, art. 31(l), 37 I.L.M. at 691.
64. See supra note 3. In the ITLOS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 16, available at <http://www.un.org/depts/
los/splos25.htm>, counsel appear to have "the privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the indepen-
dent exercise of their functions" in all relevant states, not just at the Seat of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea. Cf. ITLOS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 15, available at <http://www.org/depts/los/
spics25.htm>, giving similar rights to experts appointed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, art. 289, 21 I.L.M. 1761, 1323 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), who would naturally
have to perform their functions in states other than the host state of the tribunal. These sections may be useful
guides in drafting the relevant sections of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC, although
the nature of the ICC as a criminal court will require that they not be followed slavishly.
65. ICC Statute, svpra note 1, art. 48(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1027.
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cilities necessary for the performance of their functions. ''66 By contrast, counsel (presumably
including defense counsel) receive only "such treatment as is necessary for the proper func-
tioning of the court .... ,67 The prosecutors and deputy prosecutors have protections de-
fined by international law; 65 prosecutorial staff and (defense) counsel have protections de-
fined by the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court. Many of the
privileges accorded to the prosecutor and deputy prosecutors are personal, such as exemp-
tion from taxation, immunity from all arrest and so forth, as mentioned above. The dis-
tinction between "the privileges and immunities and facilities necessary for the performance
of their functions" that should be granted to prosecutorial staff and "such treatment as is
necessary for the proper functioning of the court" for (defense) counsel suggests that pros-
ecutorial staff should be accorded personal immunities similar to those of diplomats and
prosecutors. Facilities must also be available to the prosecution staff.69 These are not nec-
essarily to be afforded to defense counsel.
Prosecutorial or defense counsel rights to operate within a state that is a party to the
ICC Statute can, however, be described similarly, even given the differences in wording of
the statute. For example, the right of defense counsel or investigators to travel freely in a
state can be described in the same words as the rights of prosecutorial officials. If the
Preparatory Commission and the Assembly of States Parties were attempting to give force
to the distinction between "privileges and immunities" of prosecutorial officials and appro-
priate "treatment" of defense counsel, they could, for example, deny to the latter immunity
from arrest for violations of the travel rules.
The following example shows how this distinction might work. Prosecution officials may
need to travel to examine without modification a public site at which events relevant to a
case occurred and are allowed to do so under circumstances defined by the statute.70 The
defense may also need to make such an inspection and is entitled to ask the court for an
order or request for the assistance of the state where the site exists.7 Fairness and equality
of arms would suggest that the rights of prosecution and defense counsel to operate in a
state in fulfillment of such an order or request for assistance should be the same under the
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court. In the case of the prosecutors
or deputy prosecutors, however, diplomatic immunity will protect them from arrest for
alleged violations of the terms of the order or grant of assistance. Immunity from arrest,
whether absolute or conditional, for staff of the Office of the Prosecutor remains to be
defined in the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Court. There is, under the
ICC Statute, no necessity for defense counsel or investigators to be given any such personal
immunity from arrest for alleged violations.
This does not mean, however, that the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Court cannot be drafted to provide for such privileges and immunities for defense
counsel, but merely that it does not have to be so drafted. There may be arguments made
66. Id. art. 48(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1027.
67. Id. art. 48(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1027.
68. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 24, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
69. Cf. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 100, 37 I.L.M. at 1060. This article provides for allocation of costs
associated with execution of requests for cooperation. The costs of travel and subsistence of staff associated
with any organ of the court are to be borne by the court, but the costs of local facilities for working are not
listed among those to be borne by the court.
70. See id. art. 99(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1059.
71. See id. art. 57(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1032.
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in the Preparatory Commission and the Assembly of States Parties that the ICC Statute
intended to exclude defense counsel's personal privileges and immunities. The determi-
nation to include "privileges and immunities" for defense counsel, as opposed to rights to
operate as necessary, is thus a political one, which is not legally required by the ICC Statute
itself.
"[S]uch treatment as is necessary for the proper functioning of the court" will be defined
by a general agreement between the court (acting through the Assembly of States Parties)
and the states that are parties. It will, thus, be defined in general terms by a quasi-legislative
act, rather than on a case-by-case basis by the court, unless the agreement remits the de-
cision to the court on such a basis.
The drafting of the agreement is likely to be critical for another reason. There will
probably be no effective appeal by defense counsel in a given case that the agreement does
not in fact provide for the treatment necessary to represent the accused adequately, and,
therefore, the court should require that states provide defense counsel with greater freedom.
The law to be followed in the court is that provided by the statute,72 which does not in so
many words require any specific protections for defense counsel. Thus, it is unlikely that
the court would find that a protection for defense counsel or investigators not included in
the agreement would be available to them. The one argument that might be made, if the
agreement were truly deficient, would be that the failure to provide for protection deprived
an accused of the internationally protected right to counsel.73 Given the variation in legal
traditions concerning defense investigations in states that have, for example, ratified the
ICCPR, it is unlikely that any negotiated agreement would fail under this standard.
Both defense counsel and the prosecution, however, need the freedom to do their jobs.
To this extent, what is "necessary" for the performance of the investigative duties of pros-
ecution, defense lawyers, and investigators is essentially similar. Realistically, states will wish
to protect national security information from defense counsel as much as from the prose-
cutors,7 4 and this desire is likely to be reflected in the agreement. This is not, however,
the only way in which the prosecution and defense are likely to be restricted under the
agreement.
The right of the prosecution to operate directly in states that are parties to the ICC
Statute is itself limited. The investigative system established by the statute contemplates
that most of the investigation will be done through the cooperation of the state involved. 5
In certain circumstances, the prosecutor may execute a request outside of the presence of
the authorities of the state on whose territory the request will be fulfilled. This may be
done, however, only "where it is necessary for the successful execution of a request" and
where the request "can be executed without any compulsory measures."76 Compulsorymea-
sures, such as execution of a search warrant against the will of the party being searched,
may not occur without the cooperation of the state in whose territory the activity occurs.
72. Id. art. 21(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1015.
73. See id. art. 21(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1015 (application and interpretation of law must be consistent with
internationally recognized human rights); ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 176.
74. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 57(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1032 (Pre-Trial Chamber may issue
orders or request assistance from states to help defense preparation); arts. 72, 93(4), 99(5), 37 I.L.M. at 1043-
60 (protection of national security information where assistance requested).
75. See id. pt. 9 (international cooperation and judicial assistance), especially arts. 86-88, 93-97, 99.
76. Id. art. 99(4).
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Where the state is cooperating with an investigation, as it is generally supposed to do
under the ICC Statute, the prosecution will be either participating in the investigative
events by permission or receiving information about them. Yet this is the situation in which
protection against prosecutorial overreaching is most necessary. Thus, from the defense
counsel point of view, this limitation on the prosecution's power to investigate on-site is
significant primarily where the state involved is actively or passively impeding the investi-
gation. There is reason to believe that, even in this situation, the state will want to impede
defense investigation, as it may well be protecting information that it does not want sur-
facing in the international community. If the restriction on prosecution activities does result
in an equalizing of arms, it will likely be because the entire ICC system is not functioning
as well as would be hoped. This is not a desirable result.
Even where the prosecution is not operating directly in the state concerned, but is re-
ceiving cooperation from state authorities (which is conceived as a normal way for the
prosecution to operate),77 the defense needs authority and protection to conduct its own
factual investigation in the relevant states. The lack of such authority is somewhat mitigated
by the defense right to seek assistance through the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber of the
concerned state, 8 but this is not the same as allowing the defense a bona fide factual in-
vestigation. It is especially important to have independent defense investigations where the
state concerned wishes to see prosecutions brought in the ICC against human rights
violators-that is, where it is effectively acting as the prosecution's agent. It must be re-
membered that one of the purposes of the ICC is to create an awareness that states ought
to be assisting in the prosecution of grave offenses against international humanitarian law.
There is a good argument that the defense's right to investigate in the territory of states
that are parties to the statute should not be impeded by the limitations on the Office of the
Prosecutor that are imposed by the principle of complementarity. Where complementarity
is working properly, the defense is effectively working against both the Office of the Pros-
ecutor and the resources of the cooperating state. True equality of arms suggests that the
defense may need greater scope for investigation than the ICC Prosecutor.
It may not, however, be legally or politically possible to achieve this result in the agree-
ment. 9 Complementarity is the result of state concerns about sovereignty. Complemen-
tarity limitations on the prosecution would, thus, be seen by states as legal limitations on
actions by the court. This would prevent the court from intruding its workings, including
those of defense counsel, beyond the range authorized by the ICC Statute. For example,
the court "shall enjoy in the territory of each State Party such privileges and immunities as
are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes." 0 One would have great difficulty arguing
that this provision grants the prosecution the authority to take investigative steps on the
territory of a state that were not authorized by the statute and to which the state did not
77. Compare id. art. 99(1-3) (execution of requests by states) with art. 99(4) (direct execution by prosecutor
in certain circumstances).
78. See id. art. 57(3)(b) (Pre-Trial Chamber); art. 61(11) (after Confirmation hearing, functions of Pre-
Trial Chamber to be performed by Trial Chamber); and art. 64(6)(d) (Trial Chamber may order "production
of evidence in addition to that collected before trial").
79. One important way in which no major system of criminal procedure gives equality to the defense is
seizure of evidence. While the defense may have a compulsory process to produce witnesses and evidence, no
major system gives the defense the right to conduct searches and seizures in the same way as the prosecution.
It is not expected that this will be different in the ICC.
80. Id. art. 48(1).
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consent. This would be true even if such steps were necessary to complete an investigation
and bring a charge for crimes within the court's jurisdiction. It is even less likely that a
defense right to conduct such an investigation could be constructed.
In sum, the authority of defense counsel to operate on the territory of states, particularly
in conducting investigations, remains to be specified in the Agreement on the Privileges
and Immunities of the Court. Only the outer parameters of possible authority appear in
the statute itself.
B. LACK OF FUNDING FOR DEFENSE INVESTIGATION
The ICC Statute does not provide the accused with a clear right to funding for defense
investigation. Counsel is guaranteed, on behalf of the accused, "adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of the defense," and the accused has the right to "communicate freely
with counsel of the accused's choosing in confidence."" Additionally, the accused is guar-
anteed interpretation and translation services.8 2 What is missing here is guaranteed funding
for factual investigation by the accused, defense counsel, defense investigators, or defense
experts.
The need to address funding defense investigations is demonstrated by the experience of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which have not been immune from the prob-
lems that all criminal courts face. Defense counsel is regularly provided, as required by the
tribunals' statutes and rules, but some counsel have reported being unable to get funding
for appropriate legal assistance in the face of very large prosecution teams. Defense inves-
tigative services are not clearly required by their statutes and are uniformly reported by
counsel to be insufficient.
Lack of defense investigative funding can be addressed in the ICC budgetary process,
without necessarily amending the ICC Statute. The articles on funding give the Assembly
of States Parties, the nonjudicial plenary organ of the ICC, broad power over funding."s In
addition to approving the overall budget for defense services, the Assembly will adopt Fi-
nancial Regulations and Rules. 4 These regulations and rules may well spell out conditions
and procedures for approving funding of defense investigative expenditures.
The process of obtaining adequate defense investigative funding, either by amending the
ICC Statute or within the current budgetary process, will not be easy. First, prior inter-
national criminal courts have not given this issue high priority, suggesting that there is not
international customary law requiring funding at adequate levels. Adequate prosecution
funding is likely to be a problem as well. Defense funding is less likely to have high political
priority from nations whose principal motivation in joining the ICC may be to show strong
opposition to international crimes within the court's jurisdiction.
81. Id. art. 67(1)(b).
82. Id. art. 67(l)(0. This is a right of the accused, not of counsel. There is no specific guarantee of translation
into a language counsel understands. Presumably this issue will be dealt with in regulations concerning use of
the working languages of the Court. See also id. art. 50 (official and working languages) and art. 52 (Regulations
of the Court may be adopted by majority of judges if consistent with Statute and Rules of Evidence and
Procedure).
83. See id. arts. 112(2)(d), 113-14.
84. See id. art. 113. The Financial Regulations and Rules will initially be drafted by the Preparatory Com-
mission. Final Act, supra note 3, §5(e).
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Second, investigative funding is tied to the continuing discussion regarding the relation-
ship between civil and common-law criminal procedure in the ICC. Defense investigation
plays a more important role in criminal justice in the common law world. Judicial oversight
of factual investigation, discussed below in the context of the ICC Statute, s" is more im-
portant in civil law countries. As the ICC Statute stands, civil-law-type protections during
the investigation process are significant to the defense, but incomplete. This is true both
because of the substantial independence of the Office of the Prosecutor in the investigative
process8 6 and because the common-law adversary model predominates in the trial process.
Third, investigative funding is tied to the issue of the defense power to operate in states
that are party to the ICC Statute. Some investigation can be done at the site of the court,
such as expert examination of an accused's sanity. Nonetheless, most investigations must be
done in the state where evidence exists, which is usually the state where the alleged crime
was committed. Adequate funding of defense investigation is one of the prerequisites to a
fully fair criminal process; in particular, that the rights of the defense are truly available "in
full equality .. ."' But if defense counsel and investigators are not allowed to seek evidence
in a state where it exists, the fairness of the prosecution against the accused may be com-
promised, even in the presence of adequate defense funding. Thus, funding of defense
investigative services by itself will not create all the conditions necessary for fully fair pro-
ceedings.
C. POWERS AND ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN THE COURT
The parts of the ICC Statute dealing with pre-trial proceedings, trials and appeals all
give counsel an appropriate role in advancing the causes of their clients in court proceed-
ings. s Counsel's role in court proceedings is largely based in common-law adversary models
and on the role of counsel set out in the ICCPR. Defense counsel is expected to be a trusted
advisor on the decision whether to admit guilt or go to trial,89 and a vigorous advocate for
the interests of the person accused in the court. The specific way in which these powers
will be exercised, however, is largely left to the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, to be
drafted by the Preparatory Commission by the middle of the year 2000, for presentation
to the Assembly of States Parties. 90
The accused has the right to "communicate freely with counsel of the accused's choosing
in confidence .. . ."91 There may be conversations between the prosecution and defense
regarding what charges will be pressed, whether there will be an admission of guilt or
cooperation with the prosecutor against other persons, and what the appropriate penalty
in a case might be. 92 These discussions will not bind the court and there will not necessarily
be a system of plea bargaining in the court. Nonetheless, these provisions imply that defense
counsel will be a negotiator as well as a litigator on behalf of an accused. Thus, counsel will
necessarily be in the position of a strategist rather than merely a courtroom advocate.
85. See Part III infra.
86. Compare ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 54-57, with Part III, infra.
87. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(1).
88. See Parts I and I](A), supra.
89. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 64(8)(a); art. 65 (proceedings on admissions of guilt).
90. See id. art. 51; Final Act, supra id. note 3, §5(a).
91. ICC Statute, supra note 1.
92. See id. art. 65(5) (stating that such discussions shall not bind the court).
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Before trial, defense counsel will also have many opportunities to advance the cause of
the accused. Defense counsel may object to the court's jurisdiction or admissibility of a case
in the court.93 At the confirmation hearing, defense counsel may object to the charges
(presumably including a claim that the charge as filed does not state a crime), challenge the
prosecution's evidence, and present defense evidence.9 4 Defense counsel will also be en-
gaged in demanding and receiving from the prosecution and the court the evidence that
will be used in the case.
95
At trial, the role of counsel will be to attempt to convince a majority of the judges that
the prosecution failed to prove that the accused was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
96
This is a common-law standard of proof and arguments that it has or has not been met in
a given case will likely follow common-law models. To achieve this goal, defense counsel
will examine the witnesses against the accused 9l (probably on a model of common-law cross-
examination), present evidence and examine witnesses on behalf of the accused, 9s raise de-
fenses on behalf of the accused, 99 and object to evidence offered by the prosecution. 100
Much of the defense counsel's specific courtroom role remains to be defined in the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations of the Court. As with the negotiations to
produce the ICC Statute, one can expect that there will be negotiation, this time among
delegates to the Preparatory Commission meetings, as to the extent that courtroom pro-
cedures will follow a civil or a common-law model. Nonetheless, just as much of the pros-
ecutor's investigative role is influenced by the civil law tradition of judicial supervision,' 0'
much of defense counsel's courtroom role is influenced by the common-law adversarial
tradition.
HI. Judicial Supervision of Investigations in the Interests
of the Defense and Judicial Assistance to the Accused
One of the most interesting procedural aspects of the ICC Statute is its mixture of civil
and common-law protections of individuals during the investigatory process. These may
result in the use of defense counsel very early in the process in order to protect the rights
of potential accuseds to a fair trial.
The ICC Statute provides some substitute for defense investigative funding and the right
of defense counsel and investigators to operate freely in the states in which evidence exists.
93. See id. arts. 19(2)(a), 17. These challenges may be brought by any person against whom a warrant for
arrest or summons to appear has been issued; there is no requirement that the person have surrendered or
appeared in the Court. Compare id. art. 60(1&2) (indicating that requests for interim release shall be granted
only where the person sought has been arrested or appeared voluntarily in the Court).
94. See id. art. 61(6).
95. See id. arts. 61(3)(b), 64(6)(d), 67(2); but cf id. art. 68(5) (allowing prosecution to withhold evidence
that may lead to endangering a witness or family until the commencement of trial).
96. See id. art. 66(3). The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt always remains on the prosecution.
Thus the statement in the text is meant as a description of what defense counsel will be doing and not as
indicating that any legal burden will be placed upon the defense.
97. See id. art. 67(l)(e).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. arts. 64(9)(a) and 69.
101. See Part III infra.
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This is a system of judicial oversight of the investigative and pre-trial process and the
production of evidence. The court, principally through its Pre-Trial Chamber, 02 is required
to determine whether the prosecutor should be allowed to begin certain investigations, to
preserve evidence for the defense and otherwise to protect defense interests. One can see
the influence of civil law proponents in the negotiation of the ICC Statute in the judiciary's
heavy involvement in the investigative stage.55
The first such device, judicial supervision of the initiation of certain investigations, does
not directly involve defense counsel. The prosecutor may initiate investigationsproprio motu,
on the basis of information received from various sources.' °4 "If the Prosecutor concludes
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to
the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any
supporting material collected."' 0 5 Victim representations may also be presented to the Pre-
Trial Chamber. The ICC Statute does not specify the precise point when a case being
investigated proprio motu must be brought to the Pre-Trial Chamber, but this is clearly
intended to be done early in the investigation. °6 The Pre-Trial Chamber "shall authorize
the commencement of the investigation" only if it finds "there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of
the court."'0 7 If the court does not find such cause, an investigation will not be opened, but
the prosecutor may return to the Pre-Trial Chamber with more evidence to open an in-
vestigation. 08
This procedure is designed to check the power of the prosecutor to conduct groundless,
oppressive or politically motivated investigations. It is based in the civil law tradition of
judicial supervision of investigations. It does not, however, apply to cases referred to the
court either by the United Nations Security Council or by a state that is a party to the ICC
Statute. Nor does it envision a role for defense counsel in the decision.
Second, when the prosecutor has a "unique opportunity" to obtain or preserve evidence
that may not be available at trial, he or she must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber, which
shall, "upon request of the Prosecutor, take such measures as may be necessary to ensure
the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings and, in particular, to protect the rights of
the defense."'' 19 This should not be interpreted to give the prosecutor the power to define
102. A Pre-Trial Chamber is made up of three judges (though in many instances one may act alone) chosen
from the Pre-Trial Division, a group of at least six judges assigned to investigative and pre-trial matters as their
principal duties. The importance given to the pre-trial stage can be seen from the fact that in the statute, both
the Pre-Trial and Trial Divisions are to be assigned at least six judges. ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 39, 57.
103. Among the other indications of civil law influence in the ICC Statute is the dropping of the term
"indictment" as the charging document, which was used in the ICTFY and ICTR Statutes, and in earlier drafts
of the ICC Statute, and, unfortunately from a human rights perspective, the elimination of a provision from
the draft statute prohibiting searches and seizures except upon adequate cause. Draft ICC Statute, art. 67(3)
(bracketed provision). For an argument that privacy is nonetheless protected in the ICC Statute see Gallant,
supra note 2, nn. 72-86 and accompanying text.
104. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(1&2).
105. Id. art. 15(3).
106. The prosecutor does have the authority to "receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court"
before going to the Pre-Trial Chamber. Id. art. 15(2). It does not appear, however, that the prosecutor may
use the power of the Pre-Trial Chamber or other devices to request assistance of states before formally opening
an investigation using this process. Cf ICC Statute, pts. 5 (Investigation), 9 (Cooperation).
107. Id. art. 15(4).
108. Id. art. 15(4&5).
109. Id. art. 56(2).
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what may be necessary to protect the defense. Instead, it should be interpreted to mean
that when presented with a prosecutorial request to obtain or preserve evidence because of
a unique opportunity, the Pre-Trial Chamber must protect the interests of the defense as
well as the prosecution. If the accused has been arrested, counsel for the accused should be
able to participate in the proceeding to preserve evidence; if not, counsel should be ap-
pointed to represent the interests of the defense. Indeed, the Pre-Trial Chamber has the
authority, on its own motion, to take action to "preserve evidence that it deems would be
essential for the defense at trial," though it must consult with the prosecutor before doing
so and such an order is subject to an immediate, expedited prosecutorial appeal.1 ° The
Rules of Procedure and Evidence can, and should, be drafted to provide for these defense
protections.
This judicial supervision procedure, when fully implemented, may turn out to be supe-
rior, in terms of fairness to the defense, to procedures in most common law jurisdictions
where investigations are essentially performed ex parte by police and prosecution offices.
One issue that remains to be resolved is how this provision will be reconciled with the lack
of privileges and immunities of defense counsel in member states. Many unique investigative
opportunities covered here will require investigation in such states. It is hoped that the
statute will be interpreted to permit operation by defense counsel in those states in these
circumstances.
Third, the Pre-Trial Chamber may "issue such orders, including measures such as those
described in article 56 [on unique investigative opportunities], or seek such cooperation
pursuant to part 9 [on International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance] as may be nec-
essary to assist the person in the preparation of his or her defense.""' This is a significant
recognition of the need of the accused to collect evidence. The power to seek such coop-
eration from states is given to the Pre-Trial Chamber whenever the defense request occurs
before (especially in preparation for) the confirmation hearing."' After confirmation, when
for most purposes the case is transferred to the Trial Chamber, the Pre-Trial Chamber may
remain responsible, in at least some cases, for assisting the defense in this manner. The
statute states that after confirmation, the Trial Chamber constituted for a given case "shall
be responsible for the conduct of subsequent proceedings and may exercise any function of
the Pre-Trial Chamber that is relevant and capable of application in those proceedings,""'
but the Trial Chamber may refer preliminary issues to the Pre-Trial Chamber or another
judge of the Pre-Trial Division." 4
This mechanism for assuring fair proceedings requires that defense counsel play the
major role in requesting assistance and justifying such requests. The Pre-Trial Chamber
has a supervisory role here, but does not initiate requests for cooperation or issue orders
sua sponte. The Pre-Trial Chamber's orders and requests for cooperation, however, are
intended to substitute for direct defense investigation and other action in the states where
evidence exists.
110. Id. art. 56(3).
111. Id. art. 57(3)(b).
112. See id. art. 61 (giving the Pre-Trial Chamber the duty to determine whether charges should be con-
firmed against a person).
113. Id. art. 61(11).
114. See id. arts. 57(3)(b), 64(4). The Pre-Trial Division assigns three of its judges to form a Pre-Trial
Chamber for any given investigation. Id. art. 39(2).
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This mechanism is not sufficient to fully protect the rights of persons accused of crimes
in the ICC. First of all, there is no standard specified that would require the court to grant
the defense request, even where it is reasonably likely to result in evidence that is useful to
the defense. This standard may be clarified, however, in the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence. Second, there is a significant question as to the extent to which this guarantee creates
a right to collect evidence that is enforceable against recalcitrant states or witnesses." 5
Additionally, states retain the right to object to production of evidence on national security
grounds."16 These weaknesses may make either the prosecution or the defense of many cases
quite difficult, especially if a state has a political agenda concerning them. Third, even if
the court orders defense evidence produced and the state involved cooperates, this mech-
anism only permits the accused to request that the court ask states to provide identified
evidence. It does not require states to allow defense counsel or investigators to do factual
investigation in their territories in order to identify helpful evidence and witnesses. By
contrast, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, in some circumstances, authorize the prosecutor "take
specific investigative steps within the territory of a State Party," even without the state's
consent."7 Using the court to request defense evidence from states is a legal device that
will help place the prosecution and defense on more equal footing, but alone is insufficient
to address all the resource needs of defense counsel.
Fourth, the procedure for pre-trial confirmation of the charges against an accused, nor-
mally in the presence of the accused, is to be done with counsel for the accused. If the
accused has fled or cannot be found, then the confirmation hearing may be held in his or
her absence. Even then, the Pre-Trial Chamber may appoint counsel "where the Pre-Trial
Chamber determines it is in the interest of justice.""' Given the model of counsel developed
in the ICC Statute, in which counsel may be appointed to protect the interests of an absent
person, the seriousness of any charge brought in the court would suggest that the interests
of justice require that counsel always be appointed when a confirmation hearing is held in
the absence of the person being charged." 9 This too can be provided for in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.
Altogether, these provisions for judicial assistance to the accused and to defense counsel
provide important protections for the rights of the defense. They go a substantial distance
to substituting for a general right of defense counsel to investigate on the territory of any
state where evidence may be found. They do not, however, eliminate the need for such a
right, or for appropriate funding of defense investigation.
115. Compare id. art. 64(6)(b) (Trial Chamber may "[rjequire the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
production of documents and other evidence by obtaining, if necessary, the assistance of States as provided in
this Statute) (emphasis added), with art. 93(1)(e) ("States Parties shall ... comply with requests by the Court
to provide the following assistance in relation to investigations or prosecutions: ... (e) Facilitating the voluntary
appearance of persons as witnesses or experts before the Court .... ) (emphasis added). The resolution of this
apparent inconsistency may become one of the most important issues of criminal procedure facing the ICC.
Additionally, providing for payment of expenses for appearances of defense witnesses is not addressed by the
ICC Statute.
116. See id. art. 72.
117. Id. art. 57(3)(d).
118. Id. art. 61(2)(b). Note that the confirmation hearing plays a structural role equivalent to grand jury
indictment (at which the defendant is normally not present) or preliminary hearing (at which the defendant
normally is present) in many common-law jurisdictions.
119. Cf notes 11-14 and 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. Proposal for Defense Bureau
The court's structure could be greatly strengthened by the creation of a Bureau of De-
fense Counsel, analogous to the Office of the Prosecutor. In the ICC Statute, there is
currently no defense office of any type. This has the potential to create an institutional bias
in the court towards the interests of the prosecution.
A Bureau of Defense Counsel might be made responsible for developing lists of com-
petent defense counsel for appointment, obtaining appropriate clearances with responsible
governments for defense counsel and personnel to do their work, for dealing with requests
for funding of defense investigations, for education of defense counsel in the procedures of
the ICC, and other tasks. Eventually, such an office might possibly become a public de-
fender's office for those defendants who could not afford their defense, or a central resource
for defense investigators. Institutionalization of support for defense services through a Bu-
reau of Defense Counsel, though not a right of defendants by itself, would go far toward
guaranteeing that the right to counsel truly means the right to adequate and effective
counsel.
A Bureau of Defense Counsel would add balance to the institutional arrangements of the
court. As the ICC Statute stands, the prosecutor will have an effective voice in issues such
as revising the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the regulations of the court, the ongoing
budgetary process, and other issues of overall policy and day-to-day operations. Indeed, the
Presidency, the three-judge administrative organ of the court, "shall coordinate with and
seek the concurrence of the Prosecutor on all [administrative] matters of mutual concern."' 0
Defense counsel and others concerned with issues of fairness to the accused do not have
an institutional voice in the system.
Defense counsel in past and current international criminal courts have served on a case-
by-case basis. While this is a traditional means of providing defense services around the
world, in both civil and common-law systems, it presents a special problem for an inter-
national criminal court. In most systems, defense counsel are geographically localized
around a courthouse or in a city or town. They often develop into a "defense bar," a group
that can provide education, information and an "institutional memory" for new counsel or
counsel taking on a new type of case. By contrast, in the ICC, persons eligible to be defense
counsel will be scattered around the world. Education about the substantive law and pro-
cedure of the court would likely be an important function of a Bureau of Defense Counsel.
Education about practice and procedure will likely be particularly important, because the
court practice will almost certainly include a mixture of common-law and civil-law criminal
procedure, a combination unfamiliar to most lawyers.
The defense function, even more than the prosecution function, requires independence
from political and other influences. Advocacy on behalf of defendants must be zealous and
without fear of reprisal. Without an independent defense bureau, it is likely that adminis-
trative tasks concerning defense counsel will be assigned to the registrar. While the Reg-
istrar's Office is designed to be independent, it is also designed to be neutral. For example,
it is the prosecutor, not the registrar, who manages all the functions of the Prosecutor's
Office.2 The Registry is in conception a neutral service for all parties. It should not be
120. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 38(4).
121. See id. arts. 38(3)(a) (independence of Prosecutor from Presidency), 43(1) (Prosecutor's powers and
functions not to be prejudiced by Registrar's responsibility for "non-judicial aspects of the administration and
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placed in the position of having to administer much of the defense program. Yet, if no
defense bureau is created, the Registry may well wind up with tasks such as maintaining
the list of eligible defense counsel, creating a system for assigning particular counsel to cases
where counsel has been appointed, and supervising payment of fees to and monitoring costs
incurred for investigation by defense counsel.'
Given the current organization of the court, the easiest path to developing a Bureau of
Defense Counsel is to make it an administrative office of the Registry. Some protection
could be provided for the independence of the body by ensuring that the registrar would
be unable to compel disclosure of client secrets, confidential defense investigative infor-
mation or defense strategy, and would not control any decisions that the office of the defense
might make concerning the granting of appointed counsel, investigative services or funding
(if such decisions were assigned to the office).
To create it as it should be in theory, as a truly independent organ of the court, may be
more difficult. The organs of the court are listed in the statute.2 3 The ICC Statute provides
that the Assembly of States Parties may "establish such subsidiary bodies as may be nec-
essary."2 4 This could be read to mean that the Assembly of States Parties may only create
bodies subsidiary to itself or to the organs of the court created by the ICC Statute. 25 If this
is the case, creating a truly independent Defense Bureau, the structural equivalent of the
Office of the Prosecutor, will require an amendment to the ICC Statute. If, however, "sub-
sidiary" is taken simply to mean "non-plenary," then the plenary quasi-political organ, the
Assembly of States Parties, may be able to create such an office with the same connection
to other offices as that of the prosecutor and the Registry.
Creating a defense office seems more likely now than it did several months ago. At the
first meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court, France
made a proposal to create such an office. 26 The details of the proposal are complex and
servicing of the Court"), 46(2) (removal of Prosecutor to be done by Assembly of States Parties, rather than
judges).
122. Many states actually use systems in which a judicial or neutral office is responsible for the assignment
of counsel. It is the institutional weakness of the defense in the Statute and in prior international criminal
courts that suggests that this model should not be followed when the ICC comes into being.
123. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 34 (Organs of the Court are the Presidency; Appeals, Trial and Pre-
Trial Divisions; Office of the Prosecutor; and the Registry). The term "organ" is used in a somewhat more
limited sense in the ICC Statute than in the general law of international organizations. In the law of interna-
tional organizations, the Assembly of States Parties would be considered an "organ" of the International Crim-
inal Court; indeed it would be considered the plenary organ. See generally HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M.
BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITuTIONAL LAW §390, at 274 (3d rev. ed. 1995).
124. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 112(4).
125. One very restrictive reading of ICC Statute, art. 112(4), would allow the Assembly of States Parties to
create only subsidiary bodies of itself, not of the Organs of the Court, because the only example given in the
statute, "an independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation, and investigation of the Court," id.,
appears to be subsidiary to the Assembly of States Parties rather than any organ. Placement as a subsidiary
body of the Assembly of States Parties would have the advantage of making the Defense Bureau truly inde-
pendent of the Organs of the Court. It would have the disadvantage of placing the Defense Bureau directly in
the control of the quasi-political body of the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties, rather than as part of the
operative judicial mechanism of the court. It is best not to have a political body as the direct controllingauthority
of a criminal defense office, lest undue pressure be brought on defense counsel for political reasons.
126. Proposal of France, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.3, at 10. This proposal has a complex structure for
the office. The author understands that there are at least two other states interested in the proposal, but that
official positions have yet to be taken.
SPRING 2000
44 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
may require considerable negotiation by delegates to the Preparatory Commission before
reaching a final form.
V. Conclusion
The ICC Statute provides for defense counsel in the context of a hybrid civil law-common
law system of criminal procedure. It is strong in many areas and will provide substantial
rights to those who are investigated and prosecuted by the ICC. The statute as it stands,
however, does not give the defense adequate authority to investigate the facts of cases in
the territory of concerned states. Nor does it explicitly provide a right to adequate funding
of defense investigation services for those accused who are unable to afford an adequate
investigation.
Some solutions to the former problem can be addressed through the Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Court, which remains to be drafted and deserves more
attention than it has yet received from the academic community. The Assembly of States
Parties can, through its budget mechanism, address the latter issue.
Institutionally, the court would be strengthened substantially by the addition of a Bureau
of Defense Counsel. Such a bureau could have a part both in the day-to-day provision of
defense services and in the overall policymaking process in the court. It could also play a
major role in ensuring the court's overall fairness.
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